Federal Reserve : Before the Fed by Ernie Siciliano
T
he United States’ first two
central banks were short-
lived. The First Bank of the
United States founded in 1791, was a
source of constant political debate,
and its 20-year charter was not
renewed. The Second Bank opened
in 1816, then lost its charter in 1836
under the antagonistic Andrew
Jackson administration. Thus began a
period when U.S. banking was signifi-
cantly less regulated than today.
For a time, government interven-
tion was limited to setting reserve
requirements. It was easy for any bank
to obtain a state charter, provided it
met the $100,000 minimum capital
requirement, about $2 million in
today’s dollars. Most alien to today’s
customs was that 7,000 state banks
issued their own currency. Y et the sys-
tem functioned with surprising
efficiency. A financial press listed the
prices of all outstanding currencies, giv-
ing full information to the market.
During the 1850s, the number of state-
chartered banks grew by 79 percent,
and the availability of financial 
capital enabled
strong econom-









banking, or broad-based branch bank-
ing experienced moderate to high
rates of growth,” economist Howard
Bodenhorn wrote.
Some have labeled this the era of
“free banking.” It lasted until the
early years of the Civil War. It was 
not market failure that derailed free
banking, but rather President
Abraham Lincoln’s war debts.
The National Banking Act
The North spent $3.2 billion to win
the Civil War, and Lincoln recog-
nized that existing taxes and tariffs
could not cover the entire cost.
During the war, the federal govern-
ment printed U.S. notes — paper
money called greenbacks. This fiat
currency was expected to be retired
after the war. But because the politi-
cal environment favored an expanded
money supply, a limited amount
remained in circulation and can still
be exchanged for cash today. 
However, the greenbacks that
remained could not entirely fund the
war so Lincoln instituted the
National Banking Act in 1863. The
act chartered national banks to com-
pete with state banks. Banking at the
time was largely local because the
economy was not fully integrated. A
disproportionate majority of the
national banks were concentrated in
the Northeast, especially in New
York City. Because of the Civil War,
the government neglected to charter
banks in the South.
Not that the South cared.
Southerners generally distrusted the
federal banks as government over-
reach. Had the South not seceded,
Southern votes in Congress likely
would have prevented the passage of
the National Banking Act. After the
war, national banks in the South con-
tinued to lag the North because the
war had gutted Southern infrastruc-
ture, and so Northern banks were
viewed as more secure.  Federal offi-
cials also were biased toward granting
national charters to already existing
banks, thus setting the South at an
even bigger competitive disadvantage.
The national bank notes would
finance Lincoln’s government
because to issue them, banks had to
purchase government bonds. In the
event that a national bank defaulted,
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The First Bank of the United States
opened in 1791 and operated for 20
years. This check was drawn on the
bank on March 26, 1794.customers could redeem the notes for
up to 90 percent of value at the
Treasury and the government would
cancel the banks’ bonds. Lincoln
hoped that the security bond-backing
provided would cause people to use
the notes to the exclusion of state
bank notes. Still, state banks, espe-
cially the most profitable ones, were
reluctant to leave the status quo.
They feared the prospect of federal
regulation.  By mid-1865, 85 percent of
American currency remained in state
bank notes.
The next year, a 10 percent tax was
imposed on state bank notes, which
put them at a severe disadvantage and
made national bank notes the nation’s
primary currency.
Growth of Retail Banking
The predictable consequence of 
the 10 percent tax was the death of
state bank notes. The unintended
consequence was innovation in bank-
ing services. With the ability to issue
currency gone, state banks had to
invent new financial services to
remain in business.
Checkable deposits, although
around before the creation of the
bank act, grew in popularity after the
tax on bank notes.  By 1881, checkable
deposits made up 82 percent of bank-
ing receipts. Checking became
especially popular among farmers
who lived in rural areas not widely
served by national banks.
In addition to checking, state
banks drew upon farmers’ need for
credit and issued real estate and com-
mercial loans. Besides their proximity
to most farms, state banks derived a
competitive advantage in the loan
market because they were much less
regulated than national banks. Those
regulations that did exist were regu-
larly flouted. Laws for commercial
lending dictated that loans be short-
term, with promise of immediate
payment, but banks regularly made
loans to farms based on mortgages of
cattle. Loans were made for farmers’
long-term fixed investments, as
opposed to helping with moving
short-term sales. National banks had
higher loan limits and were prohibit-
ed from making real estate loans.
However, they, too, exploited lax
enforcement. In fact, roughly half of
all national banks were already mak-
ing real estate loans before the law
was changed to allow them to do so. 
As the farmers’ demand for credit
services grew, so did the demand
from wealthy people for banking
services. Speculation exploded at this
time, and banks fueled it by issuing
call loans, which were loans given to
investors to purchase stocks. If an
investor defaulted, banks could seize
his stock portfolio instead. By 1870,
one-third of all loans in New York
were call loans.
Trusts, which first developed
before the Civil War with the charter-
ing of United States Trust Company
in 1853, also expanded, and by 1913
there were more than 1,800 trust
companies. While trusts traditionally
handled only land management for
the wealthy, they expanded their serv-
ices to include investment banking
and even checking accounts. They
loaned freely and under no govern-
ment regulation. Pretty soon, trusts
became almost indistinguishable
from state banks.
The Flaw(s) in the System
While the banking system was partly
responsible for the era’s robust 
economic growth, it was not perfect.
Although bank failures for non-
national banks were around 
17.6 percent (compared with 6.5 for
national banks), a government 
comptroller’s review of the failures
between 1865 and 1911 found 
that most were due to incompetence. 
The comptroller found that only 
13 percent of banks failed due to
adverse business conditions while 
the rest failed due to corruption 
or mismanagement.
If there was a fundamental flaw in
the system it was that banks were 
vulnerable to runs, which often led to
wider panics involving other banks.
There were five panics between the
passage of the National Banking Act
and the Panic of 1907. Four panics
resulted in depressions, the lone
exception being the Panic of 1890.
Panics generally followed several
patterns. Sometimes there would be a
well-publicized default at a major
bank, often caused by economic
downturn or a big-name speculator
placing a bad bet on the market.
When the public found out, they lost
confidence in the banks and scram-
bled to retrieve their savings. At other
times, farmers would rush to get cash
from banks to move crops in the fall.
Banks had loaned more than they had
on reserve so they could not meet 
all of their requirements. Because
there was no central bank or banking 
system, these panics were confined 
to specific regions and there was 
little contagion.
There were many reasons why
banks struggled to deal with panics.
For example, the large concentration
of banks in New York, and the banks’
loose lending of call loans to risk-
prone speculators, made defaults
more likely. Some economists have
argued that the banks adhered too
religiously to the reserve requirement
(usually around 25 percent) and were
too quick to stop making payments.
They argued that had banks dipped
below the reserve requirement to pay,
confidence would never have slipped
and panics would have stopped. On
the other side of the debate, econo-
mists, including Milton Friedman,
argued that banks’ closings were 
necessary and actually reduced panics.
He reasoned that had banks stayed
open and then failed, it would have
forced other banks to close, thereby
lengthening panics. Today, economists
still debate the extent to which the
banks’ behavior exacerbated panics.
What economists agree on is the
primary cause of panics: an inflexible
currency. (See “Runs Make the Bank”
on page 24, where we present an
economist’s story about panics as
deriving from the funding of illiquid
assets with liquid liabilities.) Unable
to expand currency to meet demand,
banks were handcuffed to a limited
amount of currency. Increasing the
number of national bank notes in 
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for banks to get notes, they had to 
buy government bonds. Greenbacks
— U.S. notes printed during the Civil
War that passed as legal tender —
were set at a fixed amount by the 
government. The government also
had legislated steep reserve require-
ments of about 25 percent on
deposits, further constricting the
money supply. 
The Clearinghouse Solution
After the Panic of 1857, banks devised
a market-oriented solution to address
panics. They established clearing-
houses, or bank-like organizations,
whose purpose in part was to serve as
central places where banks could
hold reserves and borrow and lend to
each other. “The existence of the
clearinghouse suggests that private
agents can creatively respond to 
market failure,” economist Gary
Gorton has written. “In fact, it 
is almost literally true that the
Federal Reserve System was simply
the nationalization of the private 
clearinghouse system.” When banks
faced high currency demand, they
would withdraw their reserves from
clearinghouses. But because clearing-
houses were wary of risking collapse
by giving out their reserves, they
issued certificates worth 75 percent
of the value of the amount they held
for the banks. In exchange for the
certificates, banks would pay back
the value of the certificates plus 
6 percent interest.
The clearinghouse certificates
began in New York City in 1860.
After 1860, other cities’ clearing-
houses began issuing notes. By 1907,
the practice became so widespread
that A. Piatt Andrew, an assistant 
secretary of the Treasury from 1910
to 1912 and assistant to the National
Monetary Commission, estimated
(with some questions over his accura-
cy) that among cities with more than
25,000 people, clearinghouses issued
a cumulative total of $330 million in
clearinghouse notes.
Over time, the practice evolved. In
1873, clearinghouses began pooling, or
putting all banks’ assets and liabilities
on a single balance sheet. The practice
added confidence to the banking 
system because, by lumping all banks
together, it made failing banks seem
more stable. Also, clearinghouse
checks were issued. Although not
backed by anything, these checks
served as currency until they were
withdrawn, though they had to be
cashed at an official clearinghouse.
Clearinghouses later began issuing
loan certificates in substantially
smaller denominations. Originally,
certificates had been in $5,000 and
$10,000 denominations. However, as
the certificates began to be used in
the buying and selling of regular
goods, the clearinghouse system in
Atlanta, for example, began issuing
$10 certificates. Pretty soon, it was
even possible to get 25 cent certifi-
cates. Such small denominations
were necessary because when sellers
made change, the currency detracted
from bank reserves, so naturally
clearinghouses wanted sellers to use
certificates instead.
Although it did not completely 
prevent economy-wide panics, 
the clearinghouse system greatly
improved the banks’ ability to meet
currency demands. Well-timed issues
of clearinghouse certificates are 
credited with preventing large-scale
spreading of the panics in 1884 
and 1890. Interestingly enough, 
the default rate on clearinghouse 
notes was low. In 1890, Spring 
Garden National Bank defaulted 
on $170,000 worth of clearing-
house loans from the Philadelphia
Clearinghouse Association, which 
represented the only recorded default
of the era.
“The most extraordinary fact
associated with the several clearing-
house episodes between 1857 and
1907,” wrote economist Richard
Timberlake, “is that the losses from
all the various note issues, spurious
and otherwise, were negligible!”
However, the clearinghouses were
not without problems. At the time, it
was illegal for state banks to issue 
private money, which included 
certificates. Even if they were legal,
the certificates would be subject to
the 10 percent tax on state bank
notes. However, like so many other
regulations, banking officials over-
looked the obvious illegality of
clearinghouse notes because of 
the clear benefits they provided to 
the economy.
Clearinghouses also posed moral
hazard and conflict-of-interest 
problems. With clearinghouse certifi-
cates largely available, banks might
be prone to profligate lending and
ignore their reserve requirements,
knowing that clearinghouses might
bail them out. In fact, as Gorton
notes, “In general, banks were not
allowed to fail during the period of
suspension of convertibility, but 
were expelled from clearinghouse
membership after the period of 
suspension had ended.” In addition
to the delayed suspensions, the 
clearinghouses set reserve require-
ments and conducted their own
audits. The efforts could not 
completely prevent loose lending, a
moral hazard problem that still exists
today with the Federal Reserve. 
Panic of 1907
The biggest weakness of the clearing-
house system was that it did not do
anything to make more currency
available when the economy needed
it. For banks to acquire national bank
notes, they needed to buy bonds.
However, in 1900, the United States
returned to the gold standard, mean-
ing the supply of government bonds
was tied to the supply of gold. The
government couldn’t buy bonds if it
didn’t have the gold to back it.
At first, the system worked well, 
as the return to the gold standard
coincided with new gold discoveries.
The new gold meant that the govern-
ment had money to put into the
economy, and in 1904 and 1907,
Treasury Secretary Lyman Gage used
the excess gold to inject money into
the economy by buying up bonds. He
timed the purchases so that the
money entered the economy around
the time farmers began demanding
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However, the country’s banks still
remained handcuffed. Gage himself
advocated a “large central bank with
branches,” a harbinger of  the Fed,
and the Panic of 1907 highlighted 
the ill effects of an (essentially) 
fixed currency.
The panic, easily the most damag-
ing up to this time, began when  F.W.
Heinze, famed speculator and presi-
dent of Mercantile National Bank,
lost a huge bet on United Copper Co.
In less than 24 hours, he lost $50 
million as the stock plunged from $62
to $15. 
At first, the clearinghouse system
held up and Heinze’s banks were able
to clean up their balance sheets and
remain in business. However, some of
Heinze’s associates were not so lucky.
When it was reported that Heinze
was in financial trouble, the public
suspected his friends were in similar
straits and promptly rushed those
banks. Knickerbocker Trust, whose
president was an associate of Heinze,
paid more than $8 million in just
three hours as part of the run.
Because Knickerbocker was a trust
and not literally a bank, it could not
be bailed out by the clearinghouse.
The collapse of Knickerbocker
inspired a run on other banks. The
panic was quelled by the bailouts of
J.P. Morgan, who also enlisted the
support of other financiers like John
Rockefeller and Secretary of the
Treasury George Cortelyou. To help
stem the run on Knickerbocker
Trust, Cortelyou pumped $23 million
of taxpayer money into New York
national banks. Meanwhile, Morgan
managed to raise $25 million from
various financiers in 15 minutes after
a run on the Trust Company of
America. He would later finance
another $25 million to help the 
brokerage firm Moore and Schley.
The bailouts re-instilled Americans’
confidence in the banking system,
and the panic itself lasted about a
month and a half.
Federal Reserve Act
Although the panic was brief, it had
lasting effects on legislators and they
decided to reform the banking sys-
tem. The first attempt was the
Aldrich-Vreeland Act in 1908, which
deviated little from the clearinghouse
system. The act authorized the
Treasury Department to print out 
a new series of notes that would be
lent to banks, like clearinghouse cer-
tificates, during times of crisis. The
only difference was that, unlike clear-
inghouse notes, these new notes were
subject to taxes. The new system 
successfully averted its first panic in
1913, when, at the start of World War
I, Britain and Germany left the 
gold standard, which caused a bank
run in the United States.
The act was intended to be just 
a temporary solution, and its most
influential provision was the 
creation of the National Monetary
Commission, made up of a number of
congressmen, including Sens. Aldrich
and Vreeland and Special Assistant
Treasury Secretary A. Piatt Andrew.
The commission went on a secret trip
to Jekyll Island, Ga., emerging with 
a proposal to create the National
Reserve Association, which would
consist of a group of reserve associa-
tions with the power to issue
currency in exchange for reserves 
as well as assets such as payments 
for services.
Though setting the groundwork
for the Federal Reserve, the 
association was never approved by 
Congress. Vreeland was a Republican,
and in 1912 Democrat Woodrow 
Wilson won the presidency. For the
Democrats, it marked a change from
52 years of Republican rule interrupted
only by the Cleveland administra-
tions. They were not going to spoil it
by voting for a Republican-sponsored
banking act. Appealing to their rural
and populist base, the Democrats
denounced it as a giveaway to wealthy
Northeast banks.
The Democrats responded by
passing the Federal Reserve Act in
1913 instead. It established up to 
12 district banks that worked 
with a seven-member committee in
Washington, D.C., to coordinate 
and regulate banking in the United
States. The Federal Reserve banks
issued notes backed by gold to
increase the money supply. The 
banks also served as a lender of 
last resort by lending money to banks
to meet currency demands. 
The Federal Reserve Act 
patched up some problems of the 
clearinghouse system. It eliminated 
distortions caused by different states’
regulations and enforced laws.
Having the various districts meant
there would no longer be a piling up
of reserves in New York banks. Most
important, it addressed the issue of
currency elasticity. By issuing new
currency and lending to banks, 
the Fed would be more effective in
meeting demand for currency.  RF
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